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1 Abstract
There exists a large body of research on the economic effects of creating and investing in
public transportation infrastructure. There is however a comparatively small literature on
the economic effects of the quality of existing infrastructure. Quality can be measured in a
number of ways, but we focus on measures of on-time performance. Using New York City
economic data and on-time performance from 2010-2016 we can examine the relationship
between public transportation quality and economic outcomes, in this case zip code level
payroll, number of businesses, and number of employees. We use fixed effects, random effects,
and finite mixture models, and find statistically significant effects on all three outcomes,
with increasing on-time performance increasing the number of businesses but decreasing the




Public transportation systems provide multiple benefits to the communities they serve.
By giving residents greater mobility riders are better able to choose where to live and work as
befits their skills and preferences, enhancing both their own utility and society’s. This choice
brings a host of economic, environmental, and social benefits, collectively termed option
value, which can be viewed as a positive externality of investment in public transportation.
Option value in this case may include greater workplace satisfaction, a better work-life
balance, reduced carbon emissions from not using a car to commute, etc.
New York City has often been considered a poster child for public transportation systems.
While New York City has multiple forms of public transportation this paper looks only at
the New York City subway system. New York City’s subway system is the ninth oldest in the
world, has the most stations and lines in the world, and runs 24 hours a day, every single day
of the year (MTA 2018). It serves 424 stations with over 850 miles of track and an average
weekday ridership of 5.6 million riders. These unique circumstances have proven challenging
to the maintenance of the subway as the average on-time-performance has decreased every
year since 2010 as seen in Figures 1 and 2.
Another challenge is the subway’s budget structure. New York City’s Metropolitan Trans-
portation Agency (MTA), through a series of agreements and charters, has ended up with
the state Governor, 150 miles away in Albany, in charge of the majority of the MTA’s budget.
While there have been budget problems before, the efficacy of the MTA’s budget agreements
was called into question when the city and state fought over their contribution to the MTA
budget, with Mayor Rudolph Giuliani cutting the city’s contribution by 400 million dollars,
prompting Governor George Pataki to follow suit. This set a precedent of mayors and gov-
ernors cutting MTA budgets to use the money elsewhere. The MTA turned to borrowing,
and is now spending 17% of its budget on interest payments. This makes it more difficult
for the MTA to expand, or even maintain, its current infrastructure. The NYC subway has
the dubious honor of being the only major subway system with fewer miles of track in 2018
than during World War II. These challenges may have contributed to the system’s deterio-
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rating performance, which culminated in Governor Andrew Cuomo declaring an MTA state
of emergency in 2017, pledging an extra billion dollars to infrastructure improvements as
well as loosening bureaucratic procedures.
Poor performance negates the benefits of option value when trains are consistently late
and riders are no longer able to rely on their train’s schedule. This lack of certainty, trust,
and accountability may lead to riders being forced to make suboptimal decisions due to the
logistics of their commute. Similarly, deteriorating performance may affect other quantified
gains that the subway provides, e.g. the effect of subway access to property prices (Falcocchio
et al. 2018).
The subway system is resilient and has recovered from poor circumstances before. In
the 1970s and 1980s the subway experienced some of its lowest ridership due to crime,
neglect, and inefficiency. However, a joint effort by city and state officials led to what then-
governor George Pataki termed a “transit renaissance.” By evaluating the effects of public
transportation performance, the long-term effects of aging infrastructure can be intelligently,
cost-effectively treated.
2.2 Literature Review
Weisbrod et al. (2014), in a piece prepared for the American Public Transportation
Association, used an economic impact model to analyze the effect of public policy and budget
shifts towards public transportation. Their base case used current ridership and investment,
while their hypothetical case added 14.2 billion dollars per year over 20 years. They found
that 1 billion dollars invested yields a 3.7 billion dollar increase in GDP, while also creating
more than 50,000 jobs, of which 46% are created due to long-term productivity increases and
other benefits within the community. The productivity impacts they found include access
to a broader labor market, broader customer bases, travel cost savings, which may lead to
increased consumer spending, and reduced travel congestion. These results are cumulative
over the 20 years, and suggest compounding growth over time. They also found that transit
agencies throughout the country are facing budget deficits, with the majority of agencies
forced to raise fares or cut services from 2009–2014.
Another way for transit systems to raise funds is by entering into contracts with local
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developers. Mathur and Smith (2013) examine the effect of joint development projects on
transit agency revenues. They look at five different case studies, some of which were revenue
sharing agreements and others cost sharing. These agreements can include the leasing or sale
of land, charging fees for special rights, etc. They find that while the results vary from case
to case, local real estate market conditions are perhaps the most important contributor to
revenue gained from joint development projects. Although agencies cannot directly control
real estate prices one thing agencies can do to increase their revenue include conducting
thorough studies to capture the value increase that their presence provides.
Falcocchio et al. (2018) provide one example of such a study. They look at the value
increase provided by the NYC subway to commercial properties. Commercial properties
were chosen because they benefit heavily from reliable and efficient public infrastructure,
and thus the authors feel should be asked to contribute towards the maintenance of said
infrastructure. To determine a fair contribution they first estimated how much commercial
properties benefitted from their implicit subsidizing by public transportation, which they
found to be $4.58 per square foot. Then they determined the average value lost to delays.
By using data on per capita gross metropolitan product and on-time performance (the same
metric which our study analyzes) they found that a 2% reduction in on-time performance
yields an additional average wait time of two minutes, which results in lost wages of $0.51
per square foot, based on square footage and worker density data. Using these two figures to
guide their estimation of a fair contribution, they determine that additional revenues of $332
million to $664 million could be generated if commercial and office properties were made to
contribute to the MTA budget, an amount far below the value gained from nearby public
transportation and consistent with the lost wages figure. This corresponds to a 0.3 to 0.6
percentage point increase in property tax rates, and could help offset up to $0.22 in fare
increases which may disproportionately affect low income riders.
Glaeser et al. (2008) analyzed land use and development patterns within the context of
poverty and public transportation. They posited that the traditional explanation of urban
poverty clusters, i.e. the income elasticity of demand for land did not fully explain the how
poverty in cities developed and examined alternate explanations. Using data from the 2001
National Household Transportation Survey (NHTS) in conjunction with a linear regression
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model to determine the time costs of public transportation compared to other forms of
transportation as a means of explaining the preference of the better off to use automobiles,
they found that in NYC public transportation is both slower and has higher fixed time
costs than driving. Thus as income increases, agents are expected to switch from public
transportation to driving once their opportunity cost of time exceeds the increased cost of
driving. Using a theoretical model they also present evidence that public transportation
explains almost 75% of the centralization of poverty around public transportation, with an
especially strong effect in the initial formation of such clusters. These clusters then become
ingrained over time as other factors take hold, e.g. housing prices, education, etc. These
results are also consistent when looking at multiple cities. They find that similar clustering
in London can be partially attributed to public transportation. They note, however, that
Paris is an exception to this trend, which they attribute to Napoleon III who initiated a
massive program of urban gentrification that made the city center increasingly appealing to
the wealthy. Their research has important implications both for existing and new public
transportation systems, and shows that public transportation has a profound effect on the
formation of neighborhoods and economic health of those within.
Baek (2016) attempts to analyze the impact of public transportation on food insecurity.
Food insecurity is the inability to consistently obtain a varied and sufficient diet and is an
issue that disproportionately affects poorer neighborhoods. Baek analyzes the impact of
quality public transportation on food insecurity using data from the Current Population
Survey Food Security Supplement (CPS-FSS) and the National Transit Database, covering
2006–2009, and estimates a linear probability model with both a binary dependent variable
representing general food security and a categorical measure which takes into account re-
spondents’ answers to the questions of the CPS-FSS. Baek finds that for every additional
bus running per 10,000 people food insecurity decreases by 1.6%, noting that this effect is
stronger in poorer neighborhoods as well as predominantly minority neighborhoods. These
results are in line with Glaeser et al.’s findings that public transportation quality has a
greater effect on poorer and more disenfranchised communities.
Dragu et al. (2013) studied measures of quality for public transportation systems. There
are many different ways of measuring public transportation quality, of which Dragu et al.
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considered eight: services offered, accessibility, availability of information, on-time perfor-
mance, attention given to passengers, comfort, safety, and environmental impacts. These
metrics are both quantitative and qualitative, and try to account for both objective measures
of quality as well as public perceptions of quality, which can have an inordinate impact on
ridership. Unfortunately, gathering information on all of these metrics can be difficult, costly,
and time-consuming. Dragu et al. argue that on-time performance alone can accurately ex-
plain the public’s behavior in choice of transportation. To examine their measure of quality
they performed a case study using Bucharest’s public transportation system. They analyzed
the on-time performance of an above-ground bus line on several weekends, with the idea that
these constraints should prove as beneficial as possible to the line’s timeliness. They then
surveyed riders about their experiences and found that they reported a decrease in quality
as deviations from the schedule increased, in either direction. From a provider’s perspective,
they also found that on a per-vehicle basis delays tend to compound until the vehicle ends
its route, which can lead to delays throughout the line, further affecting public perception.
Dragu et al. also note that there exists a tradeoff between consumer expectations and other
factors, such as economic feasibility or environmental impact that transportation agencies
need to consider when designing and operating their systems. Due to their findings, this
study uses on-time performance as the sole basis for its quality measures with a degree of
confidence.
3 Methodology
This study used panel formatted data to analyze the effect of on-time performance on
economic outputs, including annual payroll, number of employees, and number of establish-
ments per zip code. Panel data was chosen because it allows one to control for variables
which may be difficult or impossible to measure but that change slowly over time. For ex-
ample, panel data can control for differences in the culture across zip codes. In econometric
terms it accounts for individual heterogeneity.
The panel data models used in this study are fixed effects or random effects, depending on
the Hausman test. Fixed effects models are mechanically interesting because they allow one
to look at the effect of time-variant variables on the dependent variable while removing the
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effect of time-invariant variables. It follows that fixed effects models cannot be used to look
at the effect of time-invariant variables on the dependent variable. The tradeoff is that fixed
effects removes unobserved heterogeneity. On the other hand, random effects assumes there is
no covariance between the unobserved heterogeneity term and the covariates, which allows for
the analysis of time invariant variables. The Hausman test can be used to help decide whether
to use fixed or random effects. Hausman (1978) formulated a test whose null hypothesis is
that there is no correlation between the covariates and the unobserved heterogeneity term.
If one fails to reject the null the random effects model is more appropriate, else the fixed
effects model may be more well suited.
In addition to the more traditional panel data methods this study used finite mixture
models as another means of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. Finite mixture models
classify observations into distinct, unobserved subgroups which are not present in the data,
allowing one to analyze different groups without knowing how to exactly define a subgroup.
They do this by estimating the probability of each observation belonging to a certain group
using their distributions. Given a user specified n the model creates n different groups which
together approximate the original distribution of the data, but individually may look very
different from one another. The model then assigns each observation a group depending on
its characteristics. Thus they are most useful when the available dataset does not contain
important predictors due to the difficulty of defining such predictors or lack of data. In our
case, one argument may be that some zip codes may have a disproportionately important
line. For example, some lines may have no feasible alternative routes, even if there are
other lines serving that zip code. Another argument may be that some zip codes are less
often stopped at, instead only being commuted through on the way to a different zip code.
Quantifying such cases is difficult, but by using finite mixture models to split the data into
groups we can then analyze and infer what makes each group distinct to better understand
the effects on these sub-populations.
Finite mixture models can also be used to look at the relationship between time-variant
variables and the dependent variable, similar to fixed effects. They can achieve this by using
the deviations from the within-group mean as the variables on which the model classifies
each observation. In doing so the effects of the time-invariant variables drop out, providing
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the same benefits as a fixed effects model with the additional grouping of the finite mixtures
model. One can use the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) metric in order to determine
which model is more appropriate, as well as to determine the optimal n. The BIC is a
technique which can aid in model selection, penalizing over-specified models which may
overfit the available data. A lower BIC might indicate that a model is more appropriate.
4 Data
4.1 Collection
All data was made freely available by various city, state, and federal departments and
can be downloaded from either its respective department’s website or NYC Open Data, a
website which aggregates NYC related datasets.
Data on subway stations was obtained from NYC Open Data 1 in the form of a shapefile.
This data contains the station’s name, latitude, longitude, and the lines that serve it. Using
the latitude and longitude coordinates, the station’s zip code was reverse geoencoded. We
chose to omit Staten Island from this study because Staten Island is an anomaly in a few
respects. The island has only one train line, the Staten Island Railway, which does not
connect to any other line and does not provide a way off the island. The Staten Island
Railway also operates slightly differently than the rest of the subway. It is operated by the
Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Authority, a subsidiary of the MTA. These differences
are why it was decided that this study would focus on the rest of New York City, with its
more representative subway system.
Data on business and economic characteristics was obtained from the Zip Codes Business
Patterns dataset, collected by the United States Census Bureau yearly. This data can be
found on the Census website 2. The Zip Codes Business Patterns data includes annual and
Q1 payroll (in thousands of dollars), number of employees, and the number of businesses
in various size categories, in terms of employees: 1 to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to 19, 20 to 49, 50 to
99, 100 to 249, 250 to 499, 500 to 999, and over 1,000 employees. The Zip Codes Business




all industries in that zip code. The industry specific data is however limited to the number of
businesses, lacking number of employees and payroll, and has a significant amount of missing
data and thus this study used the numbers pertaining to all industries per zip code. This
data is available per zip code per year from 1994–2016.
Lastly, data on train performance was obtained from the MTA developer portal 3. This
study used actual on-time performance per line per year as well as the MTA’s projected on-
time performance per line per year. The MTA defines on-time performance as the percent of
the time a line arrives at its final stop within 5 minutes of its scheduled time. There also exist
a host of other metrics, such as injury rates, mean distance between failures, etc. which could
provide interesting further avenues of study. Data is available by month. This study uses the
year-to-date measure of on-time percentage as measured in November. November was chosen
instead of December due to the absence of December projected on-time performance values
in 2010, which would have resulted in one year less data. This dataset limited the analysis
period, as it only goes as far back as June 2009. Furthermore, MTA metric projections for
the next year do not exist until 2010. Since these projections are an integral part of this
study, it was decided that this study would focus on 2010–2016.
4.2 Processing
While the dependent variables all came from the Zip Codes Business Patterns dataset,
several of the independent variables had to be generated. We used two quality measures,
both of which were created for this study. The first measure was defined as:
min{L1, L2, . . . Ln} (1)
where Li represents the on-time percentage of line i out of n serving a zip code in a year. It
is called minimum performance in the regression tables.
This measure was chosen due to the idea that an organization is only as strong as its
weakest link. If a business has workers from throughout the city, each taking different lines
to get to work, one consistently delayed line may have an exaggerated impact on workplace










2), . . . (L
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n − Lpn)} (2)
where Lai refers to the actual uptime of line i in a zip code in a year and L
p
i represents the
MTA’s projected uptime for the same line in that year. It is called minimum disruption
in the regression tables. Since the sign can be negative the smallest value for disruption
represents the largest shock from the projections.
This measure was chosen as a way to account for public perceptions of a line’s relia-
bility. The MTA’s projections are made the year before, and while they don’t make their
process public, it is likely a function of prior performance as well as ongoing and planned
infrastructure improvements, ridership, number of trains, etc., using data which may not
be available to the public, meaning that these are likely the most accurate predictions of
future performance. These projections are publicly available on the MTA website and as-
suming that riders are rational, and update their expectations as new information is received
their predictions should not systematically differ from the MTA’s projections on average. It
follows that riders will adjust their behavior in response to a train’s on-time performance
and its expected performance in the future, which this metric attempts to take into account
by looking at the effects of shocks and disruptions. Tellingly of the state of the system, in
seven years of data, among 119 zip codes, a total of 833 observations, only 23 observations
or 2.76% performed better than their projections.
The final dataset was in panel format and encompassed 119 zip codes, with seven years
of data available in total, from 2010–2016. Zip codes without subways were not included in
the final dataset, nor were Staten Island zip codes for aforementioned reasons. In total there
are 833 observations with 25 variables.
4.3 Summary Statistics
Tables 1–5 show the characteristics of subway performance and economic output per
zip code. Table 1 displays summary statistics for all zip codes examined. There are no
concerning values or outliers, such as a line with 0% uptime. Tables 2–5 break down the
summary statistics by borough. Manhattan has by far the highest annual payroll, number
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of employees, and number of businesses, but also the widest fluctuation between subway
performance, as well as deviations from the MTA’s projected values. Many subway lines in
Kings, Queens, and Bronx counties are the only lines serving their specific neighborhoods,
meaning less crowded stations and tracks. However most lines run through Manhattan, often
sharing stations, leading to congestion and widespread delays when a delay in one line affects
other lines as well.
Figures 1 and 2 display the decline in the city’s subway systems visually. It groups
together the 119 zip codes into 4 counties for easier viewing. Looking at Figure 1 one can see
that there has not been a single year in the studied time period where on-time performance
actually increased. Performance either remains steady or decreases, with an especially sharp
decline from 2013–2014. Interestingly, the ordering of boroughs never changes. Queens is
consistently the best performing county, then Kings, then Bronx, then New York. In Figure
2 one can see that disruptions from the MTA’s projected values also display a downward
trend.
5 Results
Tables 6 and 7 report the results of the panel data methods. Both sets of variables were
analyzed with fixed and random effects, and the Hausman test was used to determine which
model was more appropriate. In almost all cases, the Hausman test indicated that the fixed
effects model was more appropriate. A “*” denotes cases where the results from the random
effects models were used. The Hausman test cannot be used with robust standard errors,
so a separate set of regressions were run with cluster robust standard errors, clustered on
the grouping variable, zip code. In all cases the robust result matched the sign of the non-
robust result. However, some robust results were not statistically significant at the 5% level
even if the non-robust was statistically significant at that level. These results are denoted
with a “ˆ” Table 6 reports the relationship of (1) with the dependent variables Annual
Payroll, Employees, and Establishments. Table 7 reports the relationship of (2) with the
same dependent variables. The models include the number of trains in that zip code, the
projected performance of the worst performing train for that zip code and year, NYC’s GDP
for that year, and the annual payroll, number of employees, and number of establishments
12
in that zip code for that year.
In Table 6 one can see that the relationship between (1) and annual payroll, employees,
and establishments is statistically significant at the 5% level for each coefficient. A 1%
increase in lowest on-time percentage in a zip code corresponds to a $5,742,300 decrease in
annual payroll, and almost 36 fewer employees. A 1% increase in lowest on-time percentage
also corresponds to about one more establishment per zip code.
The relationship between (2) and the same dependent variables can be seen in Table 7.
Once again, the coefficient on annual payroll is statistically significant at the 5% level, and
the coefficients for employees and establishments are significant at the 1% level. Again, the
signs for annual payroll and employees are both negative. Since annual payroll represents
the sum of every employee’s pay for that year in that zip code, it makes sense that fewer
employees results in a lower annual payroll.
Tables 8 and 9 break down the relationship of (1) and (2) respectively by county. This
shows that the most significant results pertain to New York county. There the coefficients on
annual payroll, employees, and establishments are significant to the 0.1% level. Once again,
we see the same signs and correlation between annual payroll and employees when looking
at New York county. Looking column-wise, one sees that the coefficient on establishments
is statistically significant across all counties, whereas the coefficients on annual payroll and
employees are only significant in New York county. These results imply that changes in
behavior vary by county.
Tables 10 and 11 display the results of (1) and (2) finite mixture models. The Bayesian
information criterion (BIC) were used to help determine the optimal n and whether or not
to use the fixed effects version of the finite mixture model. In all cases the BIC indicated
that the fixed effects model was more appropriate than the standard model. However in
some cases the BIC indicated that the optimal number of groups was two and in other cases
three. The differences in the BIC in the cases where n = 3 was determined to be optimal
were less than 1%, and so this study uses only the results from setting n equal to two, for
the sake of explanation.
Interpreting which observations compose components one and two requires some infer-
ence. In Table 10 one can see that the largest coefficients occur in component one, although
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the coefficients in component two are more statistically significant. In Table 11 the results
are slightly less distinct, with component 1’s coefficient on annual payroll exceeding that of
component two, but the component 2’s coefficients on employees and establishments being
the larger of the two, and all three larger coefficients being statistically significant. Again
the signs follow the same pattern. It should also be noted how similar these results are to
the New York county specific results.
To better understand how the finite mixture model split the groups, we can generate the
posterior probability of an observation belonging in a group. We generated these probabil-
ities with respect to an observation belonging to the group with the larger absolute value
coefficient, then analyzed these probabilities with an OLS regression, the results of which
can be seen in Tables 12 and 13. These coefficients are either weakly correlated (less than
20% correlation) or inversely correlated with each other, meaning that the groupings for
each regression differ strongly. Tables 12 and 13 show that the most statistically significant
predictors of group membership are a dummy variable representing whether an observation
is in New York county, the number of employees, and the number of establishments. Given
the data available any inferences about the groupings rely partly on conjecture, but we posit
that the groupings roughly correspond to business hubs, of which New York county has many,
explaining the large coefficients in each model. Kings county has also seen rapid economic
development during the years studied, with the average number of establishments per zip
code increasing 18.6%, which is reflected in the coefficient on establishments.
One possible explanation for the negative relationship between on-time performance with
annual payroll and employees is that the relationship between on-time performance and
number of establishments may vary depending on the sizes of the establishments. We can
see evidence of this in Tables 13 and 14, where the signs on the coefficients of employees
and establishments are always inverted. Tables 14 and 15 look at this relationship more
closely. We find that the coefficient on smaller businesses (1–4, 5–9, and 10–19 employees) is
positive, but that the coefficient on larger businesses is negative; better subway performance
is correlated with more small businesses. Table 16 looks at the relationship between annual
payroll and establishments of different sizes, and shows that smaller establishments (again
1–4, 5–9, and 10–19 employees) are negatively related to annual payroll. These results
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partially explain the negative relationship between on-time performance with annual payroll
and employees. As on-time performance improves more smaller employers open and these
smaller businesses may not be able to pay their employees as well as a larger company might.
6 Conclusion
Public transportation is often called the skeleton of a city, and using that metaphor New
York City has osteoporosis. NYC relies on its various public transportation systems to an
almost unique degree, expecting it to work 24 hours a day, every day, and reach the most far
flung corners of the city. This relationship had proven fruitful for many years, catapulting
the city’s wealth and standing, but along the way the incredible efforts in maintaining such
an infrastructure began to be taken for granted as budget cuts and layoffs became more
commonplace.
Both models suggest a relationship where declining subway performance has a significant
impact both on economic output as well as rider behavior. The clearest result, which com-
plements the work of Falcocchio et al. (2018) nicely is that increased subway performance
results in an increased number of businesses per zip code. This can be due to a number
of reasons, such as a larger customer base, increased access to talent, higher neighborhood
desirability, etc., all of which lead to a zip code being able to support more businesses,
ceteris paribus. These findings, in addition to Falcocchio et al.’s value of a $4.58 implicit
subsidization per square foot for commercial properties show the scale to which landlords
and commercial ventures benefit from access to quality public transit. The effects on annual
payroll and number of employees are also significant, and move in lockstep. They suggest a
story of employees and entrepreneurs changing their behavior by starting more small busi-
nesses, which tend to pay less, or by working in other zip codes when their home zip code’s
line(s) improve.
By showing the relationship between public transportation performance and economic
output we add another angle for policymakers to consider, as well as encourage more research
into this heretofore untapped field. While the problems facing public transportation agencies
all over the country are daunting, there are ways to turn it around, and it starts with raising
awareness of how far the problems extend.
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Table 1: Zip code descriptive statistics
Mean Variance Std. Dev. Min Max
Min. Performance 68.358 270.912 16.459 36.570 97.600
MTA Projection 83.486 49.571 7.041 75.000 98.700
Min. Disruption -15.609 151.462 12.307 -43.500 16.800
Annual Payroll 1747536.000 1.48e+13 3843672.000 30299.000 2.31e+07
Employees 22317.110 9.72e+08 31176.890 779.000 164531.000
Establishments 1500.011 1900672.000 1378.649 84.000 7373.000
Num. Trains 3.606 10.030 3.167 1.000 16.000
Num. Stations 3.807 6.752 2.599 1.000 15.000
GDP 1233.531 947.423 30.780 1188.749 1275.137
Num. 1–4 948.102 617015.500 785.503 47.000 4273.000
Num. 5–9 227.815 54204.630 232.819 11.000 1299.000
Num. 10–19 150.485 26823.150 163.778 4.000 856.000
Num. 20–49 106.215 16472.930 128.347 2.000 655.000
Num. 50–99 35.848 2819.007 53.094 0.000 281.000
Num. 100–249 20.642 1172.954 34.248 0.000 187.000
Num. 250–499 6.275 126.880 11.264 0.000 74.000
Num. 500–999 2.747 23.572 4.855 0.000 29.000
Num. 1000+ 1.882 10.676 3.267 0.000 20.000
N 833
Table 2: Zip code descriptive statistics for Brooklyn (King’s County)
Mean Variance Std. Dev. Min Max
Min. Performance 71.529 248.264 15.756 36.570 96.100
MTA Projection 84.738 60.996 7.810 75.000 96.800
Min. Disruption -13.744 126.916 11.266 -43.500 16.800
Annual Payroll 550260.500 2.25e+11 474385.600 102585.000 2974770.000
Employees 14535.250 9.61e+07 9803.614 3506.000 55958.000
Establishments 1457.920 516674.800 718.801 364.000 3127.000
Num. Trains 3.559 7.809 2.794 1.000 13.000
Num. Stations 4.941 9.980 3.159 1.000 15.000
GDP 1233.531 950.278 30.827 1188.749 1275.137
Num. 1–4 1005.303 256795.200 506.750 269.000 2177.000
Num. 5–9 210.303 12792.730 113.105 31.000 545.000
Num. 10–19 126.214 4657.241 68.244 22.000 359.000
Num. 20–49 78.286 1918.045 43.796 18.000 275.000
Num. 50–99 20.954 244.399 15.633 0.000 106.000
Num. 100–249 10.697 68.659 8.286 1.000 51.000
Num. 250–499 3.479 11.820 3.438 0.000 20.000
Num. 500–999 1.651 3.713 1.927 0.000 10.000
Num. 1000+ 1.034 1.864 1.365 0.000 9.000
N 238
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Table 3: Zip code descriptive statistics for Queens (Queen’s County)
Mean Variance Std. Dev. Min Max
Min. Performance 76.951 123.237 11.101 53.900 97.600
MTA Projection 85.638 55.069 7.421 75.000 98.700
Min. Disruption -8.901 46.711 6.835 -30.200 8.100
Annual Payroll 481748.400 5.70e+11 755118.200 35819.000 4723439.000
Employees 10764.240 1.49e+08 12213.580 840.000 72657.000
Establishments 1006.408 585422.400 765.129 90.000 3586.000
Num. Trains 2.235 2.211 1.487 1.000 8.000
Num. Stations 2.964 5.204 2.281 1.000 12.000
GDP 1233.531 951.138 30.841 1188.749 1275.137
Num. 1–4 684.694 243743.600 493.704 55.000 2556.000
Num. 5–9 144.628 15486.860 124.446 13.000 551.000
Num. 10–19 87.036 6593.624 81.201 4.000 431.000
Num. 20–49 58.342 4535.354 67.345 2.000 387.000
Num. 50–99 17.612 646.382 25.424 0.000 150.000
Num. 100–249 9.561 173.899 13.187 0.000 85.000
Num. 250–499 2.709 15.756 3.969 0.000 22.000
Num. 500–999 1.036 2.3013 1.517 0.000 8.000
Num. 1000+ .791 1.705 1.306 0.000 8.000
N 196
Table 4: Zip code descriptive statistics for The Bronx (Bronx County)
Mean Variance Std. Dev. Min Max
Min. Performance 62.903 290.710 17.050 36.570 90.900
MTA Projection 82.825 43.212 6.574 75.000 94.200
Min. Disruption -20.233 181.987 13.490 -43.500 1.200
Annual Payroll 364454.900 6.43e+10 253553.300 87657.000 1101432.000
Employees 9249.698 2.29e+07 4784.282 2367.000 20616.000
Establishments 739.937 57697.800 240.204 283.000 1297.000
Num. Trains 1.778 1.182 1.087 1.000 5.000
Num. Stations 3.444 1.593 1.262 1.000 6.000
GDP 1233.531 953.856 30.885 1188.749 1275.137
Num. 1–4 494.706 24968.000 158.013 200.000 808.000
Num. 5–9 100.206 1505.237 38.797 34.000 204.000
Num. 10–19 69.175 861.185 29.346 22.000 149.000
Num. 20–49 49.365 336.170 18.335 11.000 91.000
Num. 50–99 14.476 43.035 6.560 4.000 35.000
Num. 100–249 7.976 19.639 4.432 1.000 24.000
Num. 250–499 2.103 3.357 1.832 0.000 7.000
Num. 500–999 1.143 2.299 1.516 0.000 7.000
Num. 1000+ .786 .954 .977 0.000 4.000
N 126
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Table 5: Zip code descriptive statistics for Manhattan (New York County)
Mean Variance Std. Dev. Min Max
Min. Performance 61.944 273.322 16.532 36.570 96.100
MTA Projection 81.156 28.781 5.365 75.000 95.700
Min. Disruption -19.916 171.600 13.100 -43.500 16.800
Annual Payroll 4338430.000 3.45e+13 5875688.000 30299.000 2.31e+07
Employees 43426.780 2.10e+09 45786.970 779.000 164531.000
Establishments 2241.890 3920275.000 1979.968 84.000 7373.000
Num. Trains 5.476 15.331 3.916 1.000 16.000
Num. Stations 3.590 5.750 2.398 1.000 10.000
GDP 1233.531 949.765 30.818 1188.749 1275.137
Num. 1–4 1296.608 1207384.000 1098.810 47.000 4273.000
Num. 5–9 361.703 112071.100 334.770 11.000 1299.000
Num. 10–19 254.725 55481.520 235.545 7.000 856.000
Num. 20–49 191.172 34235.190 185.028 2.000 655.000
Num. 50–99 71.788 5984.999 77.363 1.000 281.000
Num. 100–249 43.114 2638.189 51.363 1.000 187.000
Num. 250–499 13.198 292.799 17.111 0.000 74.000
Num. 500–999 5.670 53.229 7.296 0.000 29.000
Num. 1000+ 3.912 23.191 4.816 0.000 20.000
N 273
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Table 6: Panel data model estimates of min. performance on economic outcomes
Annual Payroll Employees ˆ Establishments ˆ*
Min. Performance -5742.3∗ -35.77∗ 1.067∗
(-2.42) (-2.43) (2.09)
MTA Projection 3707.2 34.20∗ -1.719∗∗
(1.36) (2.02) (-2.93)
Num. Trains -106591.3 3810.0∗∗∗ 66.99∗∗∗
(-1.06) (6.23) (4.54)






Annual Payroll 0.00342∗∗∗ -0.0000194∗
(17.50) (-2.49)
cons 645407.0 -8391.5 -394.4
(0.45) (-0.94) (-1.27)
N 833 833 833
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 7: Panel data model estimates of min. disruption on economic outcomes
Annual Payroll Employees Establishments ˆ
Min. Disruption -4811.5∗ -31.95∗∗ 0.936∗∗
(-2.54) (-2.71) (2.94)
Num. Trains -100902.1 3825.2∗∗∗ -74.58∗∗∗
(-1.00) (6.28) (-4.48)






Annual Payroll 0.00344∗∗∗ -0.0000287∗∗∗
(17.66) (-4.61)
cons -149568.1 -10110.7∗ -287.3∗
(-0.22) (-2.35) (-2.48)
N 833 833 833
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 8: Panel data model estimates of min. performance on economic outcomes by County
Annual Payroll Employees Establishments
Bronx Min. Performance 570.6 -21.09 1.304∗∗
(0.19) (-1.12) (2.80)
Kings Min. Performance -3186.7 -4.126 -3.055∗∗∗
(-1.04) (-0.22) (-6.65)
New York Min. Performance -12317.0∗∗∗ -70.04∗∗∗ 1.717∗∗∗
(-4.51) (-4.09) (4.04)
Queens Min. Performance -2366.6 -11.61 0.121
(-0.67) (-0.53) (0.22)
MTA Projection 1645.5 19.51 -0.582
(0.59) (1.12) (-1.34)
Num. Trains -161944.0 3440.8∗∗∗ -51.93∗∗∗
(-1.61) (5.60) (-3.36)






Annual Payroll 0.00319∗∗∗ -0.0000197∗∗∗
(15.75) (-3.40)
cons 1168071.5 -5874.1 25.95
(0.82) (-0.66) (0.12)
N 833 833 833
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 9: Panel data model estimates of min. disruption on economic outcomes by County
Annual Payroll Employees Establishments
Bronx Min. Disruption 2326.1 -9.533 1.880∗∗∗
(0.75) (-0.49) (3.75)
Kings Min. Disruption -1007.5 6.530 -2.136∗∗∗
(-0.33) (0.34) (-4.33)
New York Min. Disruption -13563.5∗∗∗ -77.55∗∗∗ 2.128∗∗∗
(-5.30) (-4.82) (5.07)
Queens Min. Disruption 1523.6 -14.82 1.779∗
(0.35) (-0.55) (2.52)
Num. Trains -140798.5 3536.5∗∗∗ -66.07∗∗∗
(-1.42) (5.82) (-4.11)






Annual Payroll 0.00318∗∗∗ -0.0000231∗∗∗
(15.69) (-3.78)
cons 37660.6 -8649.6∗ -323.2∗∗
(0.05) (-2.02) (-2.90)
N 833 833 833
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 10: Finite mixture model estimates of min. performance on economic outcomes
Annual Payroll Employees Establishments
Component 1
Min. Performance -612.8∗∗∗ 1.197 -1.003∗∗∗
(-4.15) (0.39) (-4.67)
MTA Projection -624.9∗∗∗ 1.936 0.214
(-3.81) (0.56) (0.83)
Num. Trains -1454.8 54.51 41.29∗∗
(-0.12) (0.28) (2.99)






Annual Payroll 0.00957∗∗∗ 9.63e-08
(47.63) (0.02)
Component 2
Min. Performance -13892.4 -71.83 1.695
(-1.27) (-1.47) (1.88)
MTA Projection 15567.6 68.83 -2.713∗∗
(1.05) (1.12) (-2.89)
Num. Trains -362613.3 4519.1∗∗∗ -135.4∗∗∗
(-1.62) (3.72) (-4.45)






Annual Payroll 0.00293∗∗∗ -0.0000569∗∗∗
(8.41) (-4.12)
N 833 833 833
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 11: Finite mixture model estimates of min. disruption on economic outcomes
Annual Payroll Employees Establishments
Component 1
Min. Disruption -15858.0∗∗ -0.190 -0.695∗∗∗
(-2.74) (-0.07) (-3.86)
Num. Trains 90134.0 1973.4∗∗∗ 45.49∗∗∗
(0.58) (7.76) (3.45)






Annual Payroll 0.00663∗∗∗ 0.000000377
(59.34) (0.06)
Component 2
Min. Disruption -59.00 -86.65∗ 2.411∗∗∗
(-0.51) (-2.01) (3.56)
Num. Trains -5300246.0∗∗∗ 3249.0∗ -132.5∗∗∗
(-255.30) (2.52) (-4.44)






Annual Payroll 0.00264∗∗∗ -0.0000563∗∗∗
(6.78) (-4.10)
N 833 833 833
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 12: OLS estimates on probability of belonging to more affected group w.r.t. Table 10
Prob. Annual Payroll Prob. Employees Prob. Establishments
Bronx 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Kings 0.00939 -0.0101 0.309∗∗∗
(0.32) (-0.28) (9.40)
New York -0.270∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.116∗∗
(-8.51) (2.66) (3.23)
Queens -0.0316 0.0236 0.104∗∗
(-1.09) (0.67) (3.20)
Num. Stations -0.00313 0.0179∗∗ 0.00396
(-0.61) (2.89) (0.69)
Num. Trains -0.0153∗∗ 0.00304 -0.00684
(-3.05) (0.50) (-1.20)
Annual Payroll 1.38e-08 -1.93e-08∗ 2.09e-08∗∗
(1.95) (-2.24) (2.60)
Employees -0.00000981∗∗∗ 0.0000109∗∗∗ -0.00000589∗∗∗
(-6.81) (6.22) (-3.62)
Establishments 0.0000577∗∗ -0.0000608∗∗ 0.000183∗∗∗
(3.15) (-2.73) (8.84)
cons 1.050∗∗∗ 0.0529 0.0647∗
(40.76) (1.69) (2.22)
N 833 833 833
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 13: OLS estimates on probability of belonging to more affected group w.r.t. Table 11
Prob. Annual Payroll Prob. Employees Prob. Establishments
Bronx 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Kings -0.0125 -0.0273 0.311∗∗∗
(-0.36) (-0.76) (9.42)
New York -0.286∗∗∗ 0.0660 0.111∗∗
(-7.64) (1.69) (3.10)
Queens -0.142∗∗∗ 0.0316 0.106∗∗
(-4.15) (0.89) (3.24)
Num. Stations 0.00150 0.0165∗∗ 0.00418
(0.25) (2.62) (0.72)
Num. Trains -0.0155∗∗ -0.00261 -0.00643
(-2.60) (-0.42) (-1.13)
Annual Payroll 2.34e-08∗∗ -2.29e-08∗∗ 2.00e-08∗
(2.79) (-2.62) (2.48)
Employees -0.0000106∗∗∗ 0.00000873∗∗∗ -0.00000571∗∗∗
(-6.24) (4.92) (-3.50)
Establishments 0.0000538∗ -0.00000986 0.000180∗∗∗
(2.48) (-0.44) (8.67)
cons 1.037∗∗∗ 0.0349 0.0703∗
(34.05) (1.10) (2.41)
N 833 833 833
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 14: Panel data model estimates of min. performance on establishments by size
Num. 1–4 Num. 5–9 Num. 10–19 Num. 20–49 Num. 50–99
Min. Performance 0.922∗∗ 0.350∗∗ 0.149 -0.163∗ -0.0591
(2.75) (2.66) (1.64) (-2.51) (-1.85)
MTA Projection -1.249∗∗ -0.361∗ -0.256∗ 0.00653 0.0589
(-3.25) (-2.38) (-2.42) (0.09) (1.62)
Num. Trains 20.41∗ 15.63∗∗∗ 10.75∗∗∗ 3.075 6.138∗∗∗
(2.03) (5.53) (6.08) (1.13) (4.59)
GDP 0.751∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.0954∗∗ 0.0804∗∗ 0.0228
(5.65) (4.34) (2.63) (3.12) (1.80)
Annual Payroll -2.27e-5∗∗∗ -3.94e-6∗ -8.44e-08 6.92e-7 3.39e-6∗∗∗
(-4.42) (-2.02) (-0.06) (0.68) (6.82)
Employees 0.00583∗∗∗ 0.00324∗∗∗ 0.00273∗∗∗ 0.000914∗∗∗ 0.000381∗∗∗
(7.32) (11.02) (13.74) (5.72) (4.85)
cons -101.3 -167.4∗ -55.72 -15.04 -29.76
(-0.50) (-2.13) (-1.02) (-0.38) (-1.55)
N 833 833 833 833 833
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 15: Panel data model estimates of min. disruption on establishments by size
Num. 1–4 Num. 5–9 Num. 10–19 Num. 20–49 Num. 50–99
Min. Disruption 0.846∗∗∗ 0.192∗ 0.183∗ -0.0752 -0.0573∗
(3.86) (2.26) (2.50) (-1.45) (-2.25)
Num. Trains -72.41∗∗∗ -16.85∗∗∗ 10.90∗∗∗ 3.417 6.142∗∗∗
(-6.30) (-3.79) (6.21) (1.26) (4.61)
GDP 0.969∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.0236∗∗
(15.47) (12.66) (5.50) (8.04) (3.26)
Annual Payroll -2.72e-5 ∗∗∗ -6.68e-6∗∗∗ -1.08e-7 7.67e-7 3.40e-6∗∗∗
(-6.35) (-4.03) (-0.08) (0.76) (6.85)
Employees 0.00272∗∗∗ 0.00103∗∗∗ 0.00274∗∗∗ 0.000930∗∗∗ 0.000385∗∗∗
(4.02) (3.93) (13.76) (5.82) (4.91)
cons 13.79 -98.37∗∗ -87.85∗∗∗ -76.30∗∗∗ -30.91∗∗∗
(0.17) (-3.18) (-3.39) (-4.04) (-3.33)
N 833 833 833 833 833
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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